The Ukrainian Orthodox Church: present and perspectives

Speech of His Beatitude Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine Volodymyr at the ceremony of conferring a title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the Christian Theological Academy in Warsaw, February 18, 2008.

The UOC and the State

The position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the domain of the Church-society relations and of the Church-state relations is logical and consistent on the whole. In spite of the fact that Ukraine and the Ukrainian society have substantially changed within the few recent years, this position itself has not undergone principal transformation. It should be mentioned however that we began to formulate it more accurately and to put it into practice more consequently. Keeping to the covenant of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has always considered and still considers that the foundation principle of interaction between the Church (the Kingdom which is not of this world) and the state should be "unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).

Our attitude to the concept of the secular state may differ, we may discuss its advantages and disadvantages, but we have to acknowledge that at present this concept dominates above exception in all the European countries (even in those ones where the Church is not formally separated from the state), and in the majority of the non-European countries. In the multiconfessional Ukraine there is also no alternative to such an approach. This statement, of course, should not be interpreted in the sense that we choose between faith and tolerance and give preference to the latter. On the contrary, we believe and hope that the sincere faith cannot be forced - it is born at liberty: "no man can come unto me, except it were given unto him of my Father." (John 6, 44; 65).

Therefore it should be pointed out that the state cannot have an adequate understanding of the religious issues. It has no corresponding ‘facilities', so to say, enabling it to tell the Truth of the Divine Revelation from a heresy. The Church, living in the ontological unity with God, reveals by the conciliar mind the articles of faith and piously observes them. Everything the modern state can suggest in this respect is the theological expert examination. One can hardly claim that the colloquium of theological experts, even the most prominent ones, can define which faith is true and which is not. The history is full of examples when even the Byzantium emperors, brought up in the fold of the Orthodoxy, lapsed into heresy and supported nestorianism, monophysitism, iconoclasm etc.

It follows as a logical consequence that the main function of the state (to our mind) - is providing conditions for the unconstrained existence of the Church, as well as overcoming temptation to regard the Church or the so-called traditional confessions as a kind of unofficial "ministry on spiritual affairs". The Church in its turn has to resist temptation to seek for the state support in the competition with the other confessions, in the words of the secular language. It is obvious for the religious situation in Ukraine. As soon as the Orthodox Christians turn for help to the authorities in the Eastern regions of Ukraine, where the UOC indisputably dominates, it echoes in the Western regions where are the representatives of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in executive positions of different levels, as well as in the Central Ukrainian regions where the officials are the adherents of the UOC-KP.

It is clear from the above reasoning that our Church on the whole welcomes the advancement of Ukraine to the "European model" of the state-church relations. Speaking of the "European model" we understand all the conventionality of this phrase, since in Europe there is no such a thing as a universal paradigm of interaction of the church and state authorities. We rather mean some basic principles, formulated, in particular, in the common European documents and developed through the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. The state should recognize the autonomy of religious organisations together with their right to determine at their own discretion their internal structure and the order of forming the hierarchy. Besides, the state is not to interfere with the internal affairs of religious organisations until they constitute a threat for the public order, health, morals, freedom and rights of the other people.

Proceeding from such reasoning our Church took an active part in elaboration of the new wording of the Law of Ukraine "On freedom of worship and religious organisations" in 2006 (notice that in Ukraine the somewhat edited wording of the beginning of 1990-ies has been effective up to the present). The reason for elaboration of this bill draft was the critical assessment of the effective legislation of Ukraine in the domain of freedom of worship by the Council of Europe. On the whole we are satisfied with the activity results of the working group, which was created at the Department of Justice. In particular the bill draft made provisions for assignment of the status of legal entity to the Church as a community of religious organisations, which would strengthen the positions of the UOC and other confessions in the dialogue with the government. Unfortunately, at the request of the UOC-KP the adoption of this law was temporarily removed from the agenda.

The Accents:

Let's take the liberty to turn our attention to some principal moments which actually exist in the relations between the Church and society, but are not legislatively regulated or are regulated deficiently.

The first problem has been already mentioned - it is the assignment of the status of legal entity to religious communities. By the present, according to the Ukrainian legislation, this status is given to parishes (religious communities, speaking the language of law), monasteries, brotherhoods, missionary fellowships and theological schools. The religious communities are represented by the religious administrations or centres, i.e. by the administrative organs - such as, for example, a diocesan administration or a metropolis. The Church, as well as its separate dioceses, does not have a status of legal entity, i.e. it is devoid of the bigger part of the rights, in particular, the ownership right, which cannot be realized without this status.

The next problem of the Ukrainian legislation is virtual discrimination of the church educational institutions. The education system of Ukraine is to a great extent centralized. Correspondingly, the absence of the state recognition for one or another educational institution places it out of the education system. Diplomas of such an institution will not be recognized by the state institutions, its students will have no privileges their colleagues from the secular higher educational institutions enjoy, in particular, the travel privilege. The academic degree in theology also has no legal significance. But more important is that the Church is devoid of the right to establish its own educational institutions, in which teaching the theological subjects will be integrated into the context of general educational programme.

As a result of such groundless legal restraints the religious organisations have either to pass off the Theological departments as the departments for Religious Studies (as happens with the State University of Chernivtsi), or to make a double registration of the higher educational institution: both as private secular and as of theological institution (when one and the same educational institution has de facto two independent legal entities, such as, for example, the registered Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv) or to refuse deliberately at this stage from the integration into the system of general education (as the Kyiv Theological Academy and Seminary). To resolve this problem it is necessary to assign Theology/Divinity the status of an independent science and specialty, to which the Ministry of Education does not agree, though Theological departments exist practically at every leading European university.

One more, the last juridical problem we are to discuss is the lack of proper regulation of the Church's work at the defence and law-enforcement agencies. In practice, the UOC, as well as some other confessions perform their pastoral service both in the army and in militia, and in the border-security forces. But from the formal juridical point of view all that happens "by the back door". Since the only effective provision of the Law "On freedom of worship..." states only that "the Commandment of military units affords the servicemen an opportunity to participate in the divine services and to perform the religious rites", and the word ‘chaplain' occurs in the Ukrainian legislation only once - in the text of the Law "On symbolic of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent...".

The Regulations of the Armed Forces clarify nothing as well, since they only oblige the commandment to know the confession of their subordinates, and to guarantee the right of the servicemen to keep their religious rites individually. Thus, there is a long overdue necessity to regulate at the legislative level the principles of interaction of the state authorities and the religious organisations in such a specific domain as the Armed Forces and other military agencies, and in the penal system. All the more so that such relations passed the test of time.

The problems of relations between the UOC and the state power

For the state there has always been a temptation to create shadow mechanisms of influence upon the Church and its hierarchs. However, while in the totalitarian states such mechanisms can influence the church life, in case of the democratic countries they prove to be of no effect. The modern Ukraine is not exclusion. The analysis of the religious policy of the Ukrainian state throughout 1992-2007 testifies to the fact that all the three presidents of Ukraine (L.Kravchuk, L.Kuchma and V.Yushchenko) were the adherents of establishment of "the unified Local Church", considering it to be one of the instruments of consolidation of the Ukrainian nation.

Consequently, making it their mission to create such a unified Church, the heads of the Ukrainian state pursued a definite policy concerning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Throughout this period the Church has experienced all the range of gradations of the "impact methods": from complete ignorance and forcing out to the periphery of the civil life to the proposal of the status of the State Church in essence, in return for certain conditions.

Is the state able to give and objective and reasoned answer to the Orthodox community and to itself why it needs the Local Church? What are its hypothetical relations with the Orthodox Church on the latter's gaining an autocephalous status? The answers to these questions were not given. The desire was expressed for the Church to gain such a status. The state wants the status of the Local Church for the Ukrainian Orthodoxy. And what status does the Ukrainian Orthodoxy has today in Ukraine? What kind of internal Ukrainian status has the state given to the Orthodoxy?

The local church establishment cannot be a unilateral act of will of the power holders. The Church has to be interested in gaining the kind of status which might help the mission of the Church, and this is not our case at present. The relations between the Church and the state are far from balanced, far from promotive of realization of the idea of local church. First of all it concerns the problems of delaying and unwillingness of the state to give the Church the status of legal entity, in consequence of which the Church cannot become the owner of the property it uses, and of the property which is being returned to religious organisations it comprises. The outdated provision of the Law "On freedom of worship and religious organisations..." concerning the alternate exploitation of the religious buildings (Article 17) is still fraught of sharp conflicts. This provision creates conditions for the actual dependence of religious organizations on the biased attitude of local authorities and constantly provokes the inter-confessional conflicts and confrontations. In spite of the fact that several decrees of the President and of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine have been already issued concerning the return of the church property to religious organisations and overcoming the consequences of the former USSR politics on religion, none of the statutory acts is fulfilled in full measure.

The Primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is not allowed to perform the divine service in the original cathedral of the Kyivan Metropolitans - the Hagia Sophia Cathedral of Kyiv. The St. Volodymyr Cathedral and the Residence of the UOC Primate was captured by brigand assault of the schismatics in 1992, they are kept by the schismatics and haven't been returned yet to the Church - its lawful owner. The state remains deaf to numerous requests to declare the state holiday the Commemoration Day of the Holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Prince Vladimir (July 28). No answer was given to any of the Addresses and Statements of the Holy Councils and the Holy Synod of the UOC, irrespective of their official character, concerning any given problem. An example of the state's negligence of the Orthodox believers and of their religious feelings was the visit of the late supreme pontiff John-Paul II and the ungrounded transfer from the point of view of pastoral expedience of the Uniates' capital from Lviv to Kyiv - the Uniate Church being an exclusively regional phenomenon of Western Ukraine. The Church goes unheard in many aspects of the internal and external life. And in such a situation of negative attitude of the state to the Church the latter is demanded concessions to the volitions of the state. Is it logical? The Ukrainian Orthodox Church has no access to the school and to the mass-media; it is systematically defamed by the cluster of nationalists and is placed in the ideological limits of inferiority. But in spite of this, as the Church of the nation, it has always called, it calls and will call for the unity of the Orthodoxy, since the abnormal state of dissent diverts attention and wastes forces to the unnecessary internal fight and enmity. Instead we have to resolve by joint efforts the problems of our direct mission - evangelisation of the Ukrainian society, activating of the social, charity and educational work, and not to reproach one another of the unpatriotic behaviour and argue who of us is more Ukrainian. One has to show one's faith by one's works. (cf.: James 2:18).

The state, on its part, willing to have a united Ukrainian Orthodox Church, is ashamed to call itself Orthodox in its legislative and regulatory documents, it is ashamed to mention the special role of the Orthodoxy in its own formation and in the thousand year process of state-building of Ukraine. It is necessary to regulate legislatively the specific status of the Orthodoxy in Ukraine in order that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in its Fullness had a desire to gain the status defined by the state. The state has to declare: "I'm Orthodox".

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is open for cooperation with the state and is interested in it. But we remember what price cost our Church the independence, retaining the canonical communion, and will never let ourselves make it a bargaining chip for the solution of any given problems of the state-church relations.

All the three heads of the Ukrainian state persisted in their opinion of the church problem, emphasizing that the independent state should have an independent (i.e. autocephalous or local) Church (as L.Kravchuk said). However the conclusions and statements of some experts that the present head of the Ukrainian state allegedly exerts unprecedented pressure on the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church aiming at its separation from the Fullness of the Russian Orthodox Church are groundless. The President of Ukraine is really a proponent of integration of all the Orthodox believers of the country into one united Orthodox Church, autocephalous by its status. However, expressing openly his position on this issue, the President does not apply systematic political pressure upon our Church with the aim of canonical separation of the UOC from the Moscow Patriarchate.

It is pleasant to hear that the head of the state positions himself an Orthodox Christian, as it is becoming to Ukrainian, we think. However it is necessary to acknowledge the fact of his misunderstanding of some ecclesiological details and the reasons of the present separation in the Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Unfortunately, he understands it, as does the bigger part of the believers lacking profound church and theological knowledge, as jurisdictional affiliation differences. This is the view the administration of the "Kyivan Patriarchate" tries to impose on the society.

It should be mentioned, however, that, unfortunately, the pressure on the UOC is really exerted. And sometimes it is felt not only at the regional level, but at the All-Ukraine level as well. However, the source of this pressure is not the central governmental authorities, but the nationalist-oriented political structures and politicians, whose influence, unfortunately, is felt in the present-day political life of our country.

When our Church experiences the pressure of the government institutions, it is usually the pressure of the local state authorities. Such activity of the local authorities takes place on the large scale in Western Ukraine, where most of the officials take the liberty to pursue a policy supporting their own confession - the UGCC or the UOC-KP. The political career of an extremely nationalist-minded politician, V.M. Chervoniy, who held the office of the head of the Rivne regional state administration throughout 2005-2006, can serve a demonstrative example. Holding office of the Governor, Mr.Chervoniy implemented a confession-biased policy, fostering the infringement of rights of the believers of the UOC. But his activity in the confessional domain was not motivated by corresponding directives of the head of the Ukrainian state, but by his personal political and confessional preferences. At the same time, the President of the country had wisdom enough to give an objective evaluation of his activity and to remove him from the office, which led to a significant decrease of the pressure of the local authorities on the UOC communities.

As the above-mentioned example demonstrates, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church fulfils today its salutary mission in the most difficult and sometimes extremely unfavourable conditions. At the same time the central power may be reproached not for provoking of the conflicts, but rather for the non-operative response to their emergence in the regions.

What is the basic conclusion in the domain of the church-state relations our Church could have drawn in the recent period of its existence? What lesson has the history taught us?

First, in spite of the historical disturbances and difficulties and problems in the relations with the state power, the Church has to follow the way of freedom, retaining its internal and external independence from the state.

Second, any kind of pressure upon the Church on the part of the state in the democratic conditions is unacceptable and even inexpedient, since it cannot influence the church life radically and for a long time. It is also true that such kind of pressure has no effect on condition that the hierarchy itself does not pursue the policy of accommodation, but publicly points out to the instances of violation of rights of the believers.

The UOC and Other Christian Confessions

Ukraine is not only a multinational, but also multiconfessional state. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church has always been and remains the largest and the most influential religious organisation in Ukraine. Today it comprises 42 full dioceses, 59 bishops, and total number of parishes equals to 10 900. The Church has 20 special educational institutions, among them 7 seminaries and 12 theological schools. There is a dynamic development of the Kyiv Theological Schools, in particular, of the Kyiv Theological Academy, the educational level of which has significantly grown recently as a result of the reform and of engagement of the new pedagogical staff.

At the same time, alongside with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the country there are some other Christian confessions, exerting significant enough influence on the society.

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) is influential with the Western regions of Ukraine, comprising about three thousand and a half parishes, according to the official data. At the end of the 80-ties of the 20^th century, when this confession obtained legal status in Ukraine, the UGCC was of a strongly marked regional nature, and the activities of its hierarchy and priesthood was too politicized. All that, as well as the complicated situation in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, headed by Metropolitan Philaret (Denisenko) at that time, brought about the failure of the negotiations between our Church, Vatican and the hierarchs of the UGCC, and the problem of distribution of the church property was resolved by force on the part of the Greek Catholics. The majority of the temples of the UOC in the Western regions were forcefully occupied by the faithful of the UGCC, and the Orthodox Christians in the region got into the situation of hard pressure.

As a result, our relations with the UGCC and the UOC-KP leave much to be desired. Old sores have not been cured, and the relations between the Orthodox and the Greek Catholics are not regulated yet. Thus, in spite of the fact that many experts note some positive tendencies of the life of the UGCC, the official dialogue between our Churches is still impossible.

The relations between the UOC and the Roman-Catholic Church, whose clergy patronizes the Polish community in Ukraine, may be considered stable and benevolent. This Church comprises 7 dioceses, 804 parishes, has 13 bishops and 3 higher theological seminaries. The bishops of the Roman-Catholic Church in Ukraine seek to maintain the relations with the Hierarchy of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the cooperation between the Churches takes place within the framework of the All Ukraine Council of Churches and Religious Organisations. A positive contribution to the Orthodox-Catholic relations is made by the visits to our country of the Head of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity Cardinal Walter Casper, whose last meeting with the Higher Hierarchs of our Church took place last year in December.

The most problematic are the relations between the UOC and the two non-canonical church entities, which have arbitrarily declared themselves autocephalous churches - "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyivan Patriarchate" and the "Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church". According to statistical data of the State Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities and International Relations the total number of the "autocephalous" church communities as of January 1 of the previous year is about 5000. 3824 of them enter the UOC-KP and 1154 are in the composition of the UAOC. These values may have certain errors since the official government statistics is based on the number of registered statutes of the primary religious organisations (church communities). However, we know that sometimes the statutes of the religious communities are sometimes registered on purpose, to increase quantitative values.

However, even with certain reservations, the number of communities entering the UOC-KP and the UOAC cannot but disturb. The church separation in Ukraine is of an unprecedented volume, and it is necessary to take into account this factor for those who consider any kind of a dialogue between the canonical UOC and non-canonical entities to be irrelevant and harmful.

The Problem of the Dialogue between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the "Non-Canonical Orthodoxy" - the UOC-KP and the UAOC

Millions of people found themselves to be in schism with the legal Hierarchy and the Universal Orthodoxy. And if a certain part of them remain in schism as a result of some conscious choice, many common believers and even their ministers stay in the canonical isolation rather because of lack of the necessary dogmatic and canonical knowledge. It is common knowledge that in the Soviet period the Orthodox Church was restrained in its missionary and educational activities. It had no possibility for catechisation; the parish life was often restricted to performing divine services. Thus, at the beginning of 1990-ties, when the powerful national-patriotic movement emerged in Ukraine, many Ukrainians were taken with the ideology of romantic ethnophyletism.

In the first place it was intelligence who suffered from this ideology, having mistakenly seen in the Church an instrument for sacralisation of the young Ukrainian state. Later a part of the Orthodox clergy fell under the influence of the ethnophyletic ideology. The schism emerged. Though, it should be noted that not all of its originators' actions were motivated by this ideology. In the situation at the beginning of 90-ties, when the institutions of the UGCC began to spring rapidly, many Orthodox clergymen came to the conclusion that the only way to keep the Orthodoxy in this region was the creation of their own national Church, which could stop the voluntary expansion of the UGCC.

Were the Orthodox priests right breaking communion with the canonical episcopacy and hastily declaring their parishes "autocephalous"? They were in an extremely difficult situation that time. In Western Ukraine there was a euphoria caused by getting the national statehood. The UGCC, positioning itself as the only national Church, impetuously extended its influence and structures. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which remained in canonical communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, was consigned to become a social misfit, the Church which ought to be forever refused the right to become a full partner of the new state.

However the very fact that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church managed to re-establish its presence there, in spite of the confrontation of the canonical and "autocephalous" Orthodoxy in Western Ukraine, proves that those who had chosen the way of schism had another alternative. As one modern scientist mentions, there are moments of history when we aren't able to move either right or left, and then the only way out is the way to heaven - that is the confession of faith.

The modern UAOC, with more than 70% of its parishes situated in the western region, is a direct successor of the part of the Halychina Orthodox clergy which at the end of the 80-ties of the past century tried to preserve Orthodoxy in this land by means of its illegal "autocephalisation".

In 1995 at the request of the representatives of this branch of autocephalous movement the dialogue between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the UAOC was initiated. Unfortunately, in some time certain internal problems arouse in the UAOC and the dialogue was suspended. At the end of 2005 the head of the UAOC Methodius (Kudryakov) sent to the Holy Synod of the UOC an Address with the request to resume the dialogue. This Address was given a positive answer and the dialogue was resumed. This time the negotiations were a success. Several rounds of negotiations took place, in the course of which the parties succeeded making certain conclusions and understanding the position of the adverse party. Moreover, the analysis of the documents of the UAOC testifies that this given process prompted its administration to some change of its "ecclesiological identity". In particular, by its conciliar decision of August 15, 2006 the UAOC refused from the ideology of ethnophyletism, which had been the basis of the autocephalous movement for decades. As it was declared in the authoritative documents of the UAOC, though it is called in the official statements "the national Church" of the Ukrainian people, we understand this term in the light of Christian universalism and the canonical tradition of the Orthodoxy, combining it with the idea of the "Local Church". At the same time, as goes the statement, the hierarchy of the UAOC condemns ethnophyletism as "an erroneous view of the bases of the local church functioning", and refuses it as a way of building o the church life in Ukraine (Statement of the Council of Bishops of the UOC of August 15, 2006 on the occasion of uniting the Ukrainian Orthodoxy).

More problematic is the possibility of the dialogue of the UOC with the UOC-KP, headed by the former Metropolitan Philaret. Our Church does not oppose the idea of conducting this dialogue; moreover, this dialogue is much desired. However, strictly observing the canonical tradition, we cannot be engaged in the official and full dialogue with the UOC-KP until its Head repents the sin of schism before the Mother Church, and while he remains anathematized.

In the Church which is God-and-Man organism there is no such sin that cannot be destroyed, repented and overcome with the God's grace. The sin of schism - one of the most grievous sins - is not exclusion, as the holy fathers believed. But the schism is not a personal sin, but the sin against the Church, since here a sin of an individual causes catastrophic consequences for many. Therefore the return and graceful involvement to the church unity of those, who had seceded, have to be accompanied not only by personal repentance, but also by the restoration of unity and peace in the Church. Тhe stance of our Church on the matter of overcoming schism and restoration of the church unity in Ukraine is not motivated by any political reasons or a supercilious desire of public humiliation of the others. We expect a personal feat from the schismatic leaders - realization of their tragic situation and of the necessity of beneficial repentance. The repentance cannot be humiliating: on the contrary, it elevates a person, since its result is restoration of the grace-filled communication with God. But it cannot be reduced to a signature under some diplomatic memorandum. Sacrament profanation will not bring about the church unity and peace. On the contrary, real repentance, repentance as a personal exploit, can fill the church life with plenitude of love and unity. So it is not political repentance that we expect from those, who separated themselves from the Church Fullness, but the real one over which the angels rejoice in heavens and the faithful on the earth. This is the kind of repentance that can really heal the souls of the schismatic leaders as well as the souls of their flock.

Beyond the Church there is no plenitude of Truth and Grace. But Truth and Grace can be neither an object of ownership nor of pride. Therefore, keeping intact the purity of its faith and the canonical legitimacy of its hierarchy, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church does not stand in lone conspicuity, but is open for the dialogue with the brothers, who separated from us. Our aim is to testify to them, that in our Church dwells the love of Christ that will help them return to the house of Father, which they have once left. On the example of the loving father from the parable of the prodigal son, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is ready to meet half-way its wayward children and to anticipate their repentance with its sincerity and love.

Thus, on January 21 of the previous year we received one of the representatives of the so-called "moderate faction" of the UOC-KP, Rector of the Kyiv Theological Academy Dmitriy (Rudyuk), who delivered the Address of his church structure to the Council of the UOC. The same day the meeting of Dmitriy (Rudyuk) with Rector of the Kyiv Theological Academy, Bishop of Boryspil Anthony took place, where a number of problems the Ukrainian Theological schools face today were discussed, in particular, the problem of the state accreditation of the confessional educational institutions.

But the main point discussed was not the beginning of the dialogue, but negotiation of the conditions on which it might be initiated. The Holy Synod of the UOC has repeatedly formulated these conditions, but today it is important for us not only to point them out, but to witness to our brothers in the UOC-KP that our separation with them tears at heart, as St. Gregory the Theologian said.

At the same time we expect that the contacts of the kind will not only help us build such kind of relations, which could make the full dialogue possible, but will also foster positive changes in the ecclesiological mentality of the schismatics. We have to remember that the schism can be overcome only if there is a dogmatic agreement of opinion between the Church and the schismatics. Has such an agreement between the UOC and the "non-canonical-Orthodoxy" preserved? Certainly, if one traces the ecclesiological views of the autocephalists, one can make a conclusion that they are not faultless, and sometimes are on the border of a heresy. But on the whole a certain dogmatic single-mindedness between us has preserved, and it gives us hope that in the course of the future dialogue we will reach complete and final agreement on a number of ecclesiological issues.

The Church and Politics

Nothing can harm the church unity to such an extent as an influence of the political processes. Penetrating into the Church life, politics poisons it and divides the faithful into the "right" and "left", the "orange" and "white-and-blue", the adherents of the east and west civilization paradigms. On this basis, the Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which took place in Kyiv in December of the past year, unanimously condemned the theory of the so-called "political Orthodoxy" and called its faithful children not to bring their political preferences into the sanctuary, leaving them in the "court of the Gentiles". As it is mentioned in the conciliar resolution, the "political Orthodoxy" is non-ecclesiastic by its nature and may have no place in our Church, just as it is elevated to the rank of a dogma in the schismatic groupings of "autocephalous" movement. It "implies bringing the political slogans into the Church yard" and "it disagrees with the spirit of the Gospel of Christ". The Orthodox episcopacy of Ukraine has clearly defined their position on the topical issues of modern life: the problems of politicization of the Church, when the attempts are made to bring the spirit and the methods of political struggle into the territory of the Church. The attempts are made to transform the Church, which is "a community of the saved", into a political party, an instrument of influence. On the one hand, we experience the pressure of the parties oriented towards nationalist ideology, trying to reduce the Church being to the function of blessing the national state. On the other hand the church life in Ukraine suffers from the organisations and politicians, who try to impose on it the role of a kind of "political integrator" in the post-Soviet lands. In such a situation the Church cannot remain silent, covering this sin against conciliarity by its forbearance. Politics tears the living body of the Church into pieces, it poisons the spirit of Christian sermon, reduces the image of love the Church must reveal to the whole world.

The Church of Christ has always been and will remain universal, ecumenical. But its ecumenical dimension can be affected by the human sin in its specific local manifestation. In the history of the Local Churches one can observe both periods of flourish and of detraction of the ecumenical consciousness, usually connected with the stages of national formation and ethnic conflicts. Such detraction of the ecumenical aspect is especially dangerous for the being of the local church having multinational flock. As the historical experience of some local churches teaches us, it can cause weakening of the church unity, and sometimes even dissent. Is it worthwhile deepening the separation, already existing in the Ukrainian Orthodoxy? On the contrary, striving to overcome the schism or at least not to let it grow as carcinoma, we have to do our best so that the plenitude of catholicity and universalism were manifested in our Church.

The Church is created by Eucharist, and everything happening there is happening in the context of the Eucharist. But there is nothing so much alien to the Eucharist as politics, especially the ethnocentric one. The Eucharist community has a universal character uniting all the Orthodox Christians irrespective of their ethnic origins and cultural self-definition, and especially irrespective of their political views. And those who try to denigrate by their activity this universal character of the Eucharist community have to answer for their actions.

The Problem of Overcoming Schism in Ukraine and the Canonical Status of the UOC

Analysing the documents of the UOC from the time of the Kharkiv Council one can see that the position of the episcopacy concerning the problems of the canonical status of our church fully corresponds to the position of the kyriarchal church, and in particular with the position of His Holiness Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus Alexy II. First of all, we think that the discussion of the problem of the canonical status has to be based on exclusively theological grounds, avoiding any kind of politicizing of this internal church question. Secondly, since most of the clergymen and faithful of the UOC are satisfied today with the present status of the UOC, we are convinced that it is necessary to regard the question of its improvement only in the context of overcoming schism in the Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Third, to our opinion, the problem of improvement of the canonical status of the UOC and a mechanism of its implementation ought to be agreed by the kyriarchal Church with the Orthodox Fullness.

"The canonical unity of the Orthodox", wrote the plenipotentiary representatives of the All-Ukraine Orthodox Conference in December 1993, "is what really can give the desired result - entering of the Fullness of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into the canonical communion with the Universal Orthodoxy". "We fully share and welcome", wrote His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II in his letter-response to the Primate of the UOC, "the appeal of Your Conference to all the Orthodox Christians of Ukraine to unite on the canonical grounds of the Orthodoxy... we are convinced that this holy action will be met with enthusiasm by the Orthodox Fullness and will define the unity of its canonical position concerning the UOC. We consider important the participation of the representatives of All the Orthodox Churches in the regular Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, where the question of the canonical status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will be on the agenda."

Nowadays the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has the canonical rights analogous to those of a local church, and its status corresponds to the one it had in times of the Holy Hierarch Perto Mohyla. Moreover, the comparative analysis of the canonical rights of the Ukrainian Church, which is today an autonomous church in the composition of the Moscow Patriarchate, and of the canonical rights of the Greek Orthodox Church testifies to the fact that our real rights are wider than those of the autocephalous Church of Greece. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church resolve autonomously most of the church questions, and its canonical dependence on the Russian Orthodox Church manifests itself in the prayerful mentioning of the Patriarch of Moscow at the liturgy, as well as in the Patriarchal blessing of the Primate chosen by the Council of the UOC.

The Church and the Challenges of the Modern Europe

Consciously refraining from the political activity, the UOC in fact does not take part in the social discussion concerning the "civilization choice", believing that the Church must fulfil its salutary mission under any historical and political circumstances. At the same time we watch the processes of European integration of Ukraine, trying to respond adequately to the challenges of the new cultural and social situation.

On the one hand, the European integration for our state, suffering 4 years through from the political instability, is an obvious benefit. The complicated distribution of power between national and supranational institutions, which are indispensable consequences of entrance of the country to the European Union, decreases the temptation of power as such. May be the resolutions on the EU are passed not so operatively and effectively, but they are the result of a complicated compromise and do not depend on the will of a single person prone to error. The messianic paradigm of power (which proves to be pseudo messianic) is replaced by the technocratic concept. The power is being desacralized. It begins to serve people better and more effectively instead of being possessed by an idea of national greatness which has nothing in common with Christianity.

On the other hand the European integration brings about the temptation of relativism. Its heroes, idols do not believe in truth, but in the compromise. Basic values of the modern Europe are formal. It seems that the cradle land of the Christian civilization respects the right to be or not to be a Christian more than Christ Himself. The modern Europe cherishes the freedom of choice. Bu the freedom of choice by itself cannot be a positive aim of human life, but only its necessary condition. If we ask an average European about the positive values, in other words, what for it is worth living and dying, he or she will possibly refrain from the answer. May be it is one of the vocations of the East European nations - to remind the faithless West Europe that there are values of more ontological, deep and principal nature than the freedom of choice as such. At least the renaissance of Catholicism during the pontificate of John Paul II and the expansion of the Orthodoxy in the West Europe in the ХХ century proves that these expectations are not groundless.

When speaking about the modern European culture we have to recall postmodernism. It is widely criticized, the European cultural elite repeatedly reminds of the death of the post-modernism and tries to find an alternative vector of development, but the postmodernism still remains the manifestation of the emotional and intellectual self-perception, most corresponding to the spirit of the age.

What are the challenges of the modern European culture, marked by the spirit of postmodernism, for the Christian consciousness? To answer this question one has to recollect the principal characteristics of the postmodern culture: fragmentarity, ambiguity, irony and decanonisation, i.e. demolition of all canons, including religious and national ones. Postmodernism fights the faith similar to the totalitarian Communist movements of the 20th century, but its weapon is more dangerous than that of its predecessors. Postmodernism does not believe anyone and in anything. Faith is subject to mockery and to the attempts of destruction by means of total irony and doubt. Is there any possibility of faith if truth is relative and being is controversial?

How can the church adequately respond the challenges of post-modernism? Postmodernism has a vulnerable point - it strives for "the Real". Total cynicism and irony may prove to be a mask on the face of the modern culture, being in pursuit of the real and authentic. Thus, the temptation of postmodernism may become the purifying furnace, preparing the human heart for accepting the Gospel. On the one hand, postmodernism is a challenge, addressed to every Christian, a challenge that requires our faith and deeds to be devoid of the theater pathos, but to be real and radiating real love. On the other hand, it is a challenge for the modern society, which feels the restraint of the post-modern thinking and the yearning for genuine things - real or wholesome love, real or wholesome beauty, real or wholesome communication. The European society yearns for God, though the modern Europeans often forget His name. The mission of the Church is to remind our contemporaries that the real beauty and the real communication can be only in Jesus Christ, who restores human heart the very moment it opens to Him.